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MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE:
A REFUTATION REVISITED
William Hasker

This paper carries forward the discussion initiated by the publication in 1986
of "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge." Answers are given to two objections that have been raised against the original argument. Next, an alternative
argument by Robert Adams is discussed; this argument has the advantage of
avoiding reliance on one of the most controversial premises of the original
argument. Finally, a definition is given for "S brings it about that Y," and this
definition is used to construct a proof of the "power entailment principle."

I
In the years since the publication of "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge," 1
the argument of that essay has played a significant part in the continuing
debate over divine middle knowledge. Several defenders of middle knowledge have commented on it critically, and an opponent of middle knowledge
has used the argument as the model for a parallel argument of his own for
the same conclusion. 2 In view of this attention, this seems an opportune time
to revisit the "refutation" in order to assess its continuing relevance to the
middle knowledge controversy.
The argument begins by posing the question, who or what brings about the
truth of the counterfactuals of freedom postulated by middle knowledge? In
the first stage it is argued that it cannot be true, as has sometimes been
claimed, that the agent named in the counterfactual brings about its truth. In
the second stage it is argued that if this is so, then the agent cannot be free
in performing the action described in the counterfactual. So there are no true
counterfactuals of freedom.
The argument as originally presented is both lengthy and complex, but for
present purposes we can make use of a condensed (but quite accurate) version
devised by Thomas Flint. He begins by stating three premises of the argument:
(1) If E brings it about that "Q" is true, then E is a token of en event-type

T such that [(some token of T occurs) ~ Q] and [-(some token of T
occurs) ~ _QJ.3 and E is the first token of T which occurs. (Throughout
this essay, the single arrow will be used for the counterfactual conditional, the double arrow for entailment.)
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(2) Counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world
than are particular facts. (Hence, worlds which differ from the actual
world with regard to factual content are closer than those which differ
from it with regard to counterfactuals of freedom.)
(3) If it is in A's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and "Q"
is false, then it is in A's power to bring it about that Q. (This is PEP,
the "power entailment principle.")
Flint then summarizes the argument as follows:
Suppose that there is a true counterfactual of freedom about me (symbolized
by A ~ B) with a true antecedent. Suppose, furthermore, that we say that I
can bring about the truth of this counterfactual, and that I do so by performing
the action specified by B. If (I) is true, then I can bring about the truth of
this counterfactual only if it's true that, had I not performed the action specified in the consequent B, the counterfactual would not have been true. But,
argues Hasker, if (2) is true, then this necessary condition will never be
satisfied, for there will always be a world in which some of the circumstances
specified in the antecedent A are false which is closer to the actual world
than is any world in which the counterfactual of freedom A ~ B is false.
Therefore, there is no counterfactual of freedom the truth of which I can bring
about. But if (3) is true, then for me to have the power to bring it about that -B
even though A is true, I must have the power to bring it about that A ~ - B,
for the Molinist is committed to saying that (A & -B) entails (A ~ -B). Since,
as we say, it follows from (I) and (2) that I don't have the power to bring
about the truth of a counterfactual of freedom, it follows from (1), (2), and
(3), along with our initial assumption that there is a true counterfactual of
freedom, that I don't have the power to bring it about that -B given A. But
of course, as a libertarian, the Molinist is committed to saying that I do have
the power to bring it about that -B given A. If our three crucial premises
(1) through (3) are beyond reproach, it follows that we have no choice but
to surrender our initial assumption. In other words, it follows that there are
no true counterfactuals of freedom.4
Flint goes on to say, "it seems to me that Hasker's argument is surely valid;
if (1) through (3) were all undeniable from the Molinist perspective, then the
Molinists would have no choice but to abandon that perspective" (p. 105).
Since he is more than reluctant to abandon Molinism, Flint proceeds to argue
against premise (2), which states that for the purpose of evaluating counterfactuals worlds which differ from the actual world with regard to factual
content are closer than those which differ from it with regard to counterfactuals of freedom. s As Flint correctly notes, I provide support for (2) by
arguing for
(a) Counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental features of the world
than are counterfactuals backed by laws of nature 6
and
(b) Counterfactuals backed by law s of nature are more fundamental features
of the world than are particular facts.
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Of these two premises, (a) is by far the more controversial. Several arguments have been offered for (a).7 But for present purposes I will limit myself
to a single argument, the argument which points out that, since the fundamental laws of nature are indeterministic, counterfactuals based on them are
only would-probably conditionals-they assert the probability, or objective
propensity, for the event affirmed in the consequent to occur, given the circumstances as stated in the antecedent. The point is not, as Flint supposes,
that I assume there is some sort of non-logical "necessary connection" between the antecedent and the consequent of a counterfactual of freedom. (I
fear 1 have misled Flint on this point by my use of Pollock's term, "necessitation conditionals," to refer to the counterfactuals of freedom.) Rather, the
point concerns the respective logical strength of various kinds of conditionals, as measured by the guarantees they provide (if true) about what happens
in various possible worlds. Consider, then, a series of conditionals, all of the
general form, "If P, then Q." If a conditional is logically necessary, it guarantees that in no possible world will we find "P" true and "Q" false. If it is
a deterministic causal conditional, then we will not find that combination in
any world that shares its laws of nature with the actual world. If it is a
counterfactual of freedom, we cannot have "P" true and "Q" false in the actual
world or any of the set of possible worlds that are "closest to" (Pollock:
"minimally changed from") the actual world. But with a would-probably
conditional, we can have "P" true and "Q" false in the actual world, and also
in possible worlds as close as you please to the actual world. And this shows,
I maintain, that would-probably conditionals should be weighted less heavily
than counterfactuals of freedom in determining the similarities of possible
worlds.
In practice, of course, the probabilities involved in many counterfactuals
based on laws of nature are so high that they are treated, for practical purposes, as if they were deterministic causal conditionals. (Quantum indeterminacy does not in general make a perceptible difference to the behavior of
macroscopic objects.) But while this is important for our practical use of
these conditionals, I do not see that it makes any difference at all to their
logical status as would-probably conditionals. So I believe it is entirely
reasonable to hold that counterfactuals of freedom are more fundamental
features of the world than are counterfactuals backed by laws of nature. 8
Yet another possible difficulty with the first stage of the argument is pointed
out by Robert M. Adams when he writes that a "debatable point is Hasker's
assumption that if Molinism implies, as he argued, that we do not bring about
the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us, it also implies that we do
not have the power to bring about their truth. The assumption is plausible,
but 1 am not sure it has been proved. In particular, I do not take it to have
been proved by my recasting of the first stage of Hasker's argument.,,9

226

Faith and Philosophy

Without doubt, Adams has identified a lacuna in the argument as originally
stated. The argument proceeds to the conclusion that we do not bring about
the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us, and then without further ado
assumes that we lack the power to do this. IO But surely, some explanation of
this transition is needed. And this point is crucial for the success of the
argument as a whole: we need to obtain the result that we lack the power to
bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom in order to proceed to the
second stage of the argument and reach the final conclusion.
I believe, however, that the gap can be closed. The only non-trivial assumption in this first stage of the argument, in addition to (1) and (2), is that
if we bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us we do so
by performing the action specified in the consequent under the conditions
specified in the antecedent. Now I submit that all three of these assumptions
are such that it is reasonable to take the view that, if true at all, they are
necessarily true. But what is validly deduced from necessarily true premises
is itself necessary. So if the argument is valid (as Flint agrees), and the
premises are necessarily true, then what follows is not simply that we do not
bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us, but that necessarily we do not do this. But what we necessarily fail to do is not in our
power to do.
But are the premises of the argument true? I believe that they are, and I
have argued in support of the premise (namely, (2)), which has proved to be
most controversial. Nevertheless, I am willing to admit that the complexity
of the argument even in Flint's streamlined version leaves a number of points
at which doubts can arise and toward which critics can direct their fire. It
would seem desirable, then, to reach the objective by a simpler, more straightforward route, if this is possible. In order to investigate this possibility, we
tum to Robert Adams' alternative argument.
II
Adams' argument (with steps renumbered) proceeds as follows:
(6) According to Molinism,11 the truth of all true counterfactuals of freedom
about us is explanatorily prior to God's decision to create us.
(7)

God's decision to create us is explanatorily prior to our existence.

(8) Our existence is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions.
(9) The relation of explanatory priority is transitive.
(10) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 6-9) that the truth of all true
counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior to all of our
choices and actions.
(11) The relation of explanatory priority is asymmetrical.
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(12) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 10-11) that none of our choices
and actions is explanatorily prior to the truth of any true counterfactual
of freedom about us.
(13) Whatever we bring about is something to which some choice or action
of ours is explanatorily prior.
(14) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 11-12) that we do not bring
about the truth of any counterfactual of freedom about us (pp. 346-47).

Commenting on this argument, Adams says, "The central idea in this argument is that of explanatory priority, or an order of explanation .... Like the
Scholastics, I do mean to distinguish this sort of priority from temporal
priority. Even if there was no time before God decided to create us, or if
God is timeless, God's knowing various things is explanatorily prior to God's
deciding to create us." (One might add that this notion is particularly important for Molinism: middle knowledge is "middle" precisely because, in the
order of explanation, it falls in between God's "natural knowledge" of the
necessar:r truths, and his "free knowledge" which depends on his own free
actions.) 2
As we have already noted, Adams does not believe his argument establishes
that we lack the power to bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom
about us. He explains his reasoning in an endnote: "The issue here would
be whether the thesis ascribed in [(6)] to Molinism, if true, could nonetheless
be falsified by us if we did something we will not in fact do-whether there
are acts we could perform but won't that would reverse the order of explanation discussed in the first stage of the argument, by depriving the truth of
counterfactuals of freedom of its independence of the truth of their antecedents" (p. 353). Adams' reasoning can be expanded as follows: The argument 6-14 is valid, and the intermediate premises (7, 8, 11, 13) are necessary
truths. So (6) entails (14), and the negation of (14) entails the negation of
(6). So for us to have the power to bring about that (14) is false would be
for us to have the power to bring it about that (6) is false 13 -that is to say,
if we have the power to bring about the truth of a counterfactual of freedom
about us, we also have the power to bring it about that (in this instance) the
truth of a counterfactual of freedom about us is not explanatorily prior to
God's decision to create us. Adams goes on to say, "An affirmative answer
to this question [viz., whether we have the power to falsify (6)] seems to me
bizarre, and unlikely to be appealing to Molinists. but I'd rather not undertake
here the burden of justifying its exclusion."
I believe, however, that the exclusion in question is not at all difficult to
justify. One way to do this would be by the route pursued in the previous
section: If the premises of the argument are true, they are necessarily true,14
and so the conclusion (in this case (4» is necessarily true as well. But there
is another, possibly more compelling, way to show that we lack the power in
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question. To see this, we add the following two premises to the beginning
of Adams' argument:
(4) According to Molinism, God is perfectly provident.
(5) According to Molinism, if God is perfectly provident, the truth of all
true counterfactuals of freedom about us is explanatorily prior to God's
decision to create us.
The expression "perfectly provident" is taken from Alfred J. Freddoso's
authoritative exposition of Molinism; it designates the traditional strong doctrine of divine providence which Molinism upholds. Freddoso describes the
doctrine as follows:
As traditionally expounded, the doctrine of divine providence involves the
thesis that God, the divine artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders, and
provides for all the effects that constitute His artifact the created universe
with its entire history, and executes His chosen plan by playing an active
causal role sufficient to ensure its exact realization .... God's speculative
postvolitional knowledge of the created world-His so-called knowledge of
vision-is to be explained wholly by reference to (i) His prevolitional knowledge and (ii) His knowledge of what He Himself has willed to do. Unlike
us, God does not have to be acted upon by outside causes in order for His
cognitive potentialities to be fully actualized; He does not, as it were, have
to look outside Himself in order to find out what His creative act has
wrought." 15
The point is this: God, in his decisions about which persons to create, consults his middle knowledge to determine how they would respond to various
circumstances in which he might place them. So the truth-values of the
counterfactuals of freedom concerning created free agents must be fixed prior
to his decision to create the agents, which is what (5) says. From this Molinist
perspective the truth of (4) and (5) cannot be gainsaid.
But now we are able to assert, following reasoning which parallels the
reasoning of Adams explained above, that
(15) If it is in our power to bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom
about us, it is in our power to bring it about that God is not perfectly
provident (from 4-14 and PEP).
But surely it is the case that
(16) According to Molinism, it is not in our power to bring it about that God
is not perfectly provident.
And so we may conclude that
(17) According to Molinism, it is not in our power to bring about the truth
of counterfactuals of freedom about us (from 15-16).
Now, I cannot exci:Jde absolutely the possibility that there might be some
professed Molinist who would deny the truth of (16), and so avoid the con-
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clusion of this argument. But I think it is clear that it is deeply repugnant to
Molinism to attribute to us the power-even the unexercised power-to bring
it about that God is not perfectly provident. Indeed, "repugnant" may be too
weak an expression in this context. Immediately following the passage from
Freddoso quoted above, he goes on to say, "Indeed, as a being who is 'pure
actuality,' He cannot depend causally on any other being for His perfections"
(p. 5). This is as much as to say that it is incompatible with an essential
property of God-that God is "pure actuality"-for God's perfect knowledge
to be dependent on a creature, as it would be if (6) were false. But in that
case, the power to bring it about that (6) is false is the power to bring it about
that God lacks one of his essential properties. And not even the most fervent
desire to save Molinism can justify attributing that sort of power to us. I6
I maintain, therefore, that (17) has been demonstrated, and if so the second
stage of the refutation of middle knowledge can proceed just as it does in
Flint's summary. And the consequence of this is stark: there are no true
counterfactuals of freedom.I7

III
It would, however, be entirely premature to expect a capitulation from the
Molinists at this point. For as presently formulated, both stages of the argument depend essentially on (3), the power entailment principle. So a critic
who does not find (3) to be an evident truth can seize upon this as a weak
point at which to attack the argument. Such an attack has been mounted by
Thomas Flint. He does not, indeed, say outright that (3) is false, nor has he
presented a counterexample to the principle. But he finds the expression
"bring about" to be seriously ambiguous and unclear, and until this expression
is clarified he thinks it is impossible to say whether or not (3) is true-or for
that matter, whether or not (3) is inconsistent with Molinism.
In order to put this discussion in context, it will be helpful to set out briefly
what has previously been stated concerning the sense of "bring about.,,18 In
my view,
(i)

A brings about

Bl9

is intermediate in strength between
(ii) A causes B

and
(iii) A occurs, and if A were to occur, B would occur.

I take it to be evident that (i) is stronger than (iii)-the latter, which I term
the "counterfactual dependence relation" is remarkably weak; many philosophers seem to see in it much more than is actually there. (i) is, on the other
hand, weaker than (ii); every instance of causing is an instance of bringing
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about, but the converse does not hold. One example of bringing about which
is not causal comes from Jaegwon Kim?O When Socrates' jailor caused him
to drink the hemlock, he both caused and brought about Socrates' death; he
also, by the same action, brought about Xantippe's becoming a widow. But
the link between the jailor's action and Xantippe's widowhood is not "causal"
in the relevant sense-no conceivable form of causal isolation for Xantippe
could have prevented her from becoming a widow. Another example concerns the truth of propositions: By reading a newspaper I bring it about that
"Hasker will read a newspaper tomorrow" was true yesterday, but I don't
think I cause that proposition to have been true yesterday. Beyond this, it
can be said that "bringing about" is a relation which is transitive, asymmetrical, and irret1exive, such that what is brought about obtains in consequence
of that which brings it about. (These formal features are shared by both
bringing about and causation; counterfactual dependence, on the other hand,
is nontransitive, nonsymmetrical, and ret1exive.)
Now I have to say that it seems to me that these explanations are sufficiently clear that I am able to grasp propositions (such as (3» involving the
notion of "bringing about," and in some cases (again, such as (3» to see that
those propositions are true. Flint, however, demurs, and complains that I
have failed to recognize that "the territory between causal and counterfactual
power is a vast and largely uncharted land, one which harbors a plethora of
distinct accounts of bringing about" (p. 113). To illustrate his point, Flint
proposes two possible definitions of "bring about"; each definition possesses
some initial plausibility, but on neither definition is it at all plausible that
both (1) and (3) are true. And this creates a reasonable suspicion, Flint thinks,
that it is only by preserving the ambiguity of "bring about" that I can make it
seem plausible that all the premises of my argument against Molinism are true.
In a recent manuscript Flint has t1eshed out his objection still further by
elaborating no less than eleven distinct definitions for "S brings it about that
y.,,21 But in this whole array of definitions there is not a single one that will
permit all of the premises in the argument against middle knowledge to be
true together. Thus the burden falls on the opponent of middle know ledge to
show that his argument is not based on mere equivocation.
Clearly, Flint has presented a challenge that must be taken seriously. I
would agree, furthermore, that none of the definitions he suggests is acceptable as it stands. Still, some of them do deserve serious consideration. Take
for example
(BA3)

S brings it about that Y iff: 0- Y, and for some X, S causes it to be
the case that X, and X ~ Y.

This formula has significant merits. The first conjunct insures that what is
brought about is a contingent proposition. If we assume that an agent causes
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her own action, then bringing about anything always involves causing something, even if that which is brought about is not itself caused. And many
cases of bringing about which are not causal are cases in which what is
brought about is entailed by what is caused; thus, my bringing about the past
truth of a proposition by my present action. So far, then, so good.
But the definition fails for my other example: Socrates' death does not
entail Xantippe's widowhood all by itself; for that, we need also the historical
information that Socrates and Xantippe were married at the time. This suggests a move to another definition suggested by Flint:
(BA4)

S brings it about that Y iff: O-Y, and for some X, S causes it to be
the case that X, and (X & H) =} Y (where "H" stands for the history
of the world prior to the occurrence of X).

This takes care of Xantippe nicely, but now there is another problem: both
(BA3) and (BA4) are far too generous in what they permit an agent to bring
about. According to (BA3), if I bring it about that I see a sunrise I also bring
about the sunrise, and according to (BA4), an agent by performing any action
whatever brings about the entire past history of the universe, which is implausible. To remedy this, we can add to (BA4) the restrictions that (a) "H"
by itself does not entail "Y," and (b) it is not the case that if "X" were false
"y' would still be true. 22 (This permits us to drop the first conjunct, since
any necessary truth will be true even if "X" is false.) And so we have
(BA4*) S brings it about that Y iff: For some X, S causes it to be the case
that X, and (X & H) =} Y, and -(H =} Y), and -(-X --t Y).

Upon reflection, (BA4 *) seems to me to be a good candidate for a definition
of the intuitive notion of "bringing about" with which I have been working.
There is plenty of room for further refinement, of course, and it is hard to be
sure there could not be some counterexample which would force the addition
of more clauses to the definition. But I am willing for the time being to accept
it as a basis for discussion. One merit of (BA4 *) is that it guarantees the
satisfaction of the condition stated in (1) for any instance of bringing about
as defined by the formula?3 To be sure, this is not essential for the success
of our revised argument, since (1) does not playa role in this argument. But
(1) does seem to represent a plausible condition on bringing about, and so it
is satisfying to have its truth preserved by our definition.
More importantly, however, (BA4*) allows for a straightforward proof of (3),
the power entailment principle. Suppose that the propositions "X," "P," and
"H" are such that if S were to cause it to be the case that X she would thereby
bring it about that P. Suppose, that is, that (H & X) ~ P, and -(H ~ P), and
-(-X ~ P). Now according to (BA4*), if S, by causing it to be true that X,
were to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q," then by that very same
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action S would bring it about that Q, provided that -(H ~ Q), and -(-X -t
Q). But if "Q" is in fact false, then (since (H & X) ~ P and P ~ Q) "X"
also is false, and it will be true that -(-X -t Q). And if "Q" is false, it cannot
be entailed by "H," so -(H ~ Q) will also be true. So if S by causing it to
be the case that X would bring it about that P, and P ~ Q and -Q, then S by
causing it to be the case that X would also bring it about that Q.
Now suppose that S has the power to bring it about that P by causing it to
be the case that X. It follows, trivially, that S does have the power to cause
it to be the case that X. But it was shown above that S's causing it to be the
case that X would bring it about that Q-always assuming, of course, that P ~
Q and -Q. SO if S has the power to bring it about that P by causing it to be
the case that X, S also has the power to bring it about that Q.24 Which is to
say: If it is in S's power to bring it about that P, and "P" entails "Q" and
"Q" is false, then it is in S's power to bring it about that Q. Q.E.D.25
It would seem, then, that, with Flint's help, we have succeeded in answering
two of his major criticisms of PEP. We have a definition of "bringing about"
which, while not perfectly precise, is articulate enough to put to rest charges
of vagueness and ambiguity. And there can be no reasonable doubt that,
given this definition, PEP is true. This, I think, represents real philosophical
progress-and it narrows the options considerably for critics of PEP. So far
as I can see, there are only two possibilities remaining: they can argue against
the definition on the grounds that it fails to capture our intuitive notion of
bringing about, or they can attack PEP directly by producing counterexamples?6 It will be interesting to see what can be made of these two possibilities.
Thomas Flint, however has suggested (in correspondence) yet another possible difficulty with (BA4 *). This definition, he claims, permits the Molinist
to argue in a perfectly straightforward way that an agent does have the power
to bring about the truth of her counterfactuals of freedom. But if this is so,
then the success of the definition in other respects (as argued above) is by
no means a triumph for the anti-Molinist. On the contrary, it undermines the
very conclusion the anti-Molinist is determined to establish, namely that we
do not have the power in question.
Now, Flint is entirely correct in claiming that (BA4*), taken together with
Molinist premises, implies that an agent can bring about the truth of her own
counterfactuals?7 He is mistaken, however, in supposing that this fact constitutes a difficulty for the anti-Molinist. To see why it does not, we have
only to reflect on the formal structure of the refutation of middle knowledge.
That argument, in all of its forms, is a reductio ad absurdum; it takes Molinist
premises, together with other plausible principles, to establish an anti-Molinist conclusion, namely that there are no true counterfactuals of freedom. If
the argument is valid (and Flint has admitted that it is, at least in its original
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form), then we know immediately that it contains inconsistent premises-and
of course we also know that from inconsistent premises anything whatever
can be deduced; in particular, it can be deduced that an agent has the power
to bring about the truth of her own counterfactuals of freedom.
The important question, then, is not whether this conclusion can be deduced
from those premises, but rather which of the premises ought to be rejected.
Since the Molinist will not give up any of the Molinist premises, it becomes
incumbent on him to say which other premise(s) should be rejected, and why.
With regard to the original form of the argument, premise (2) seems to be the
target of choice for Flint and other Molinists. And while I think that premise
can be defended, there doesn't at this point seem to be any way to resolve
the disagreement concerning it. But this premise is not an assumption either
of Adams' argument, or of my modification of that argument. So it would
seem that Molinists need to gi ve convincing reasons for rejecting the premises
of the revised argument, if they are to avoid the conclusion that it is Molinism
itself that is to be rejected. 28
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NOTES
1. William Hasker, "A Refutation of Middle Knowledge," Nous 20 (1986), pp. 545-57.
2. See Alfred 1. Freddoso, Introduction to Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge
(Part N of the Concordia) (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1988), pp. 75-78; Edward
Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry Into Divine Attributes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 150-60; Thomas Flint, "Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge,"
Philosophical Studies 60 (1990), pp. 103-15; and William Craig, "Hasker on Divine
Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 67 (1992), pp. 89-110. For Plantinga's objection to
the argument, see William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, p. 48. Timothy O'Connor,
an opponent of middle knowledge, has also criticized the argument in "The Impossibility
of Middle Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 66 (1992), pp. 139-66. The parallel argument is found in Robert M. Adams, "An Anti-Molinist Argument," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), pp. 343-53.
3. Here I believe a small modification is called for. Rather than the formula given in
the text, the correct condition is:

-[(no token of T occurs) ~ Q].
Either formula will suffice for the construction of a valid argument, but the original version
has the undesirable consequence that a token of T does not bring it about that "Q" is true
in any case such that "Q" might be true even if no token of T were to occur.
4. "Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge," p. 105. (Subsequent page references to Flint
are to this article.)
5. Flint is not alone in his suspicion of this premise; it is also questioned by Freddoso,
Wierenga, Craig, and O'Connor.
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6. Note, however, that I don't really need a premise as strong as (a); it would suffice
for my purposes if it turned out that counterfactuals of freedom are (approximately)
equally fundamental with counterfactuals based on laws of nature.
7. See God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. 45-47, and "Response to Thomas Flint,"
Philosophical Studies 60 (1990), pp. 119-20.
8. Two additional objections are relegated to an endnote. O'Connor argues that, if we
assume there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is plausible to suppose that "though
the laws of nature may strictly imply only would-probably conditionals, there are, nonetheless, tme counterfactuals of the ordinary sort corresponding to these ... Though the
consequents of such counterfactuals are not fully determined, they would obtain, as a
matter of contingent fact, given the antecedents" ("The Impossibility of Middle Knowledge," p. 144). My reply to this is that even if we suppose such counterfactuals to exist,
there is no reason to suppose we have any cognitive access to their truth-values, any more
than we have cognitive access, prior to the event, to the tmth-values of counterfactuals of
freedom. In any case, these are not the counterfactuals my argument is about; that
argument concerns specifically "counterfactuals backed by laws of nature." And I have
yet to hear an explanation of how from generalized probabilistic conditionals we can
derive singular non-probabilistic conditionals.
William Craig, however, characterizes as "false" my assertion that "all natural laws are
probabilistic rather than deterministic" ("Hasker on Divine Knowledge," p. 106, and see
Note 32, pp. 109-10). He goes on to say, "Modern physics rests on the twin pillars of
Quantum Theory and Relativity Theory, but these two bodies of law are irreconcilable
with each other. Relativistic laws are not probabilistic." Craig is certainly right about
modern physics. But since, as he says, quantum theory and relativity theory are incompatible, it is certain that both cannot be wholly true. What is needed (but has so far proved
exceedingly difficult to provide) is a theory of "quantum gravity" which combines what
is true in both theories. If he is interested, I would be prepared to offer Professor Craig
a modest wager on the proposition that the combined theory, when it appears, will preserve
the indeterminism of quantum mechanics.
9. "An Anti-Molinist Argument," p. 340. (Subsequent page references to Adams are to
this article.)
10. See God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. 48-51.
11. Here and throughout the argument, I take it that the references to Molinism are not
part of the formal argument but rather serve as a reminder that essential premises of the
argument are derived from the Molinist theory.
12. According to William Craig, Adams equivocates on the term, "explanatorily prior,"
and thus his argument fails. (See William Lane Craig, "Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (December 1994), pp.
857-61.) For my argument that Craig is mistaken about this, and for an analysis of
"explanatorily prior" which supports Adams' argument, see "Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, A Response to William Craig," in Philosophy and Phenomenolog ical Research, forthcoming.
13. It should be noted that Adams' argument here, as I have reconstructed it, depends
on (3), the power entailment principle.
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14. The only premise concerning which this might reasonably be doubted is (6). (6) is
certainly not self-evident; that's why Molinism is invoked to justify its being taken as a
premise. But I think it is very plausible to suppose that if (6) is true at all, it is necessarily
true. It does not seem to make sense to suppose that, whereas as a matter of fact the
counterfactuals are independent of the truth of their antecedents and thus available to God
prior to his decision about creation, these same counterfactuals might have been such that
their truth depended on events in the world subsequent to the creation. Nor does it seem
to make sense to suppose that, if such counterfactuals are available to God, he would
ignore them in making his decision about creation.
15. Introduction to Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, pp. 3-5.
16. These considerations can also help us in dealing with a doubt Adams expresses
about his own argument. He writes, "The most debatable point in this argument, in my
opinion, is the assumption [(II)] that the relation of explanatory priority is asymmetrical .
. . . [W]ith respect to the specific explanatory relationships among facts and events that
figure in my argument, I think it is plausible to rule out the possibility of a closed
explanatory loop. I will not claim more than plausibility for the assumption, however"
(p. 347). I think it is quite clear that Molinism-at least, the kind of Molinism represented
by Freddoso-cannot contemplate the possibility of closed explanatory loops in this kind
of case. For this would make the counterfactuals of freedom, as well as God's providential
knowledge of them, dependent on the actions of creatures, which is precisely what
Freddoso proclaims to be impossible.
17. It should be mentioned here that Adams presents an alternative also for the second
stage of the argument; the crucial premise of this alternative argument is
If I freely do A in C, no truth that is strictly inconsistent with my refraining
from A in C is explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in C (p.
350).
I believe Adams' argument is sound, and it may be especially helpful to persons who have
qualms about some of the premises in my version of the argument.
18. See, "Response to Thomas Flint," pp. 121-22.
19. This formula speaks of events as bringing about other events, whereas (3) speaks
of persons as bringing about events. (3), then, involves the notion of "agent causation,"
a notion which both Flint and I accept as meaningful and as describing an important feature
of our world. The link between the two uses of "bringing about" is forged by saying that
a person brings about an event just in case that person's performance ofsome action brings
about the event.
20. "Noncausal Connections," Nous 8 (1974), p. 41.
21. "Hasker's Attack on Middle Knowledge," unpublished. My thanks to Professor
Flint for sending me this paper and for giving me permission to quote from it.
22. This results in a certain restriction on the things we can be said to bring about. If
I chop down a tree with the result that it dies, I do not bring it about that the tree dies, for
it would die (sooner or later) in any case. But I do bring about various more specific
events, such as that the tree dies as a result of being cut down by me. I judge that this
slight regimentation of usage is acceptable.
23. When S brings it about that Y as specified in (BA4*), the event-type T has as its
sole token its being the case that X. It is then readily seen that all three clauses of (I)
(given the emendation of (I) specified in note 2) will be satisfied.
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24. Here I am relying on the following principle: If by causing it to be the case that X
S would bring it about that P, and it is in S's power to cause it to be the case that X, then
it is in S's power to bring it about that P. I trust the reader will agree with me in finding
this unproblematic.
2'5. Actually, from my standpoint this proof has it backwards; I am more confident of
the truth of PEP than I am of the correctness of the definition (BA4*)~ But perhaps in
time I can learn to love them both equally.
26. For some alleged counterexamples, see Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom
and Foreknowledge (New York: Oxford, 1991), pp. 108-115; William Hasker, "Zagzebski
on Pdwer Entailment," Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993), pp. 250-55; and Linda Zagzebski,
"Rejoinder to Hasker," Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993), pp. 256-60. I do not believe this
exchange creates any serious difficulties for the power entailment principles.
27. Flint shows this as follows: Let Y =(H ~ X). Given (BA4*), S has the power to
bring about (H ~ X) if and only if:
(i) S has the power to cause it to be the case that X
(ii) (X & H) = (H ~ X)
(iii) -[H => H ~ X)], and
(iv) -[-X ~ (H ~ X)]
As he rightly says, it is hard to see how any of these could be denied.
28. My thanks to Thomas Flint, Timothy O'Connor, Philip Quinn, and Linda Zagzebski
for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

